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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

9 THE ESTATE OF CINDY LOU HILL, by  
and through its personal representative,  
10 Joseph A. Grube; and CYNTHIA  
METSKER, individually,

11 Plaintiffs,

12 vs.

13 NAPHCARE, INC, an Alabama  
corporation; HANNAH GUBITZ,  
14 individually; and SPOKANE COUNTY,  
a political subdivision of the State of  
15 Washington,

16 Defendants.  
17  
18

No. 2:20-cv-00410-MKD

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO  
SPOKANE COUNTY'S MOTION FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT<sup>1</sup>

Noted for consideration on  
March 7, 2022

19 <sup>1</sup> Defendant's motion is moot if the Court grants Plaintiffs' pending Rule 37(e)  
20 Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No. 28.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>I.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>II.</b>	<b>STATEMENT OF FACTS .....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>III.</b>	<b>ARGUMENT.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>A.</b>	<b>Summary Judgment Standard.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>B.</b>	<b>Spokane County is liable for relying on untrained jail guards to medically monitor seriously ill inmates. ....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1.</b>	<b>The County violated the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a “medical watch” practice that created a substantial risk of harm to vulnerable inmates. ....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>(a)</b>	<b>Cindy Hill was deprived of her constitutional right to adequate medical care.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>(b)</b>	<b>Spokane County has a longstanding practice of relying on untrained corrections officers to monitor patients with acute medical needs. ....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>(c)</b>	<b>Spokane County’s medical watch practice reflects deliberate indifference to detainees’ serious medical needs. ....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>(d)</b>	<b>The County’s medical watch practice was the moving force behind Ms. Hill’s death. ....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>The County negligently caused Ms. Hill’s death by making non-medically trained jail guards responsible for monitoring her when she was suffering from an acute and serious illness. ....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>C.</b>	<b>Spokane County is liable for the negligent and unconstitutional practices of NaphCare and Nurse Gubitz.....</b>	<b>19</b>

<b>IV. CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>20</b>
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## I. INTRODUCTION

Cindy Hill died on the floor of her Spokane County Jail cell roughly eight hours after a nurse ordered that she be placed on a twice-hourly “medical watch” due to her extreme abdominal pain. She died an agonizing death, ultimately succumbing to overwhelming sepsis caused by a rupture in her intestine that allowed gastric fluid to leak into her abdomen, inciting profound shock and eventual cardiac arrest. Ms. Hill was a victim of a longstanding practice at the jail of relying on corrections officers with no medical training to “monitor” inmates with serious and acute medical needs. During the excruciating eight-hour period prior to her death, instead of being attended by qualified medical professionals who could diagnose and treat her condition, Ms. Hill was left alone in one of the jail’s “medical watch” cells, where officers would walk by periodically, peer into her cell, and simply note whether she appeared to be awake or asleep.

Defendant Spokane County is not entitled to summary judgment. Testimony from the County’s own witnesses confirms the existence and nature of the jail’s “medical watch” practice, which subjects seriously ill persons in the County’s custody to a substantial risk of harm and was the moving force behind Cindy Hill’s suffering and death. The County is liable for the harm caused by its unconstitutional and negligent procedures for medically monitoring acutely ill patients at the jail.

1 Furthermore, because the County cannot contract away its legal duty to  
2 provide adequate medical care to the persons confined in its jail, it remains liable  
3 for the unconstitutional and negligent acts committed by its co-defendants, Nurse  
4 Hannah Gubitz and NaphCare, Inc. The County wholly ignored this independent  
5 ground for relief in its motion, precluding summary judgment on that basis alone.

## 6 **II. STATEMENT OF FACTS**

7 The facts supporting Plaintiffs' opposition to Spokane County's summary  
8 judgment motion are set forth in Plaintiffs' Statement of Disputed Material Facts  
9 and Statement of Facts in Opposition to Summary Judgment.

## 10 **III. ARGUMENT**

11 Spokane County's longstanding practice of relying on corrections officers  
12 with no medical training to monitor acutely ill patients was both negligent and  
13 deliberately indifferent to the constitutional right of County detainees to receive  
14 adequate medical care. Because the County's unconstitutional "medical watch"  
15 practice was the moving force behind Cindy Hill's suffering and death, it is liable  
16 for the losses suffered by her estate and her surviving daughter. The County is also  
17 liable for the unconstitutional and negligent acts of its co-defendants.

### 18 **A. Summary Judgment Standard**

19 "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material  
20 fact exists and the moving party is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law."

1 *Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Vill.*, 723 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1984).  
2 In considering a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant  
3 is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”  
4 *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citation omitted).  
5 “Summary judgment is inappropriate if reasonable jurors, drawing all inferences in  
6 favor of the nonmoving party, could return a verdict in the nonmoving party’s  
7 favor.” *Diaz v. Eagle Produce, Ltd.*, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).

8 **B. Spokane County is liable for relying on untrained jail guards to**  
9 **medically monitor seriously ill inmates.**

10 Spokane County has a duty under both state and federal law to provide  
11 adequate medical care to the individuals in its custody. *J.K.J. v. City of San Diego*,  
12 No. 20-55622, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33778, at \*16 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021);  
13 *Shea v. Spokane*, 17 Wn. App. 236, 242, 562 P.2d 264, 268 (1977). The County  
14 violated those duties by relying on untrained custody officers to medically monitor  
15 patients with serious medical needs, a practice that led to Ms. Hill’s death.

16 **1. The County violated the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing a**  
17 **“medical watch” practice that created a substantial risk of harm**  
18 **to vulnerable inmates.**

19 To establish liability against Spokane County for violating the Constitution,  
20 Plaintiffs must show (1) that Cindy Hill was deprived of a constitutional right, (2)  
that Spokane County had a longstanding practice or custom, (3) that the practice or

1 custom was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm, and (4)  
2 that the practice or custom caused harm to Plaintiffs. *See Castro v. Cty. of Los*  
3 *Angeles*, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). “Whether a policy or  
4 custom exists, as well as whether it created a substantial risk of serious harm, is  
5 generally a question of fact for the jury.” *Fricano v. Lane Cty.*, No. 6:16-cv-01339-  
6 MC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96521, at \*30 (D. Or. June 8, 2018) (citation omitted).

7       **(a) Cindy Hill was deprived of her constitutional right to adequate**  
8       **medical care.**

9       The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to adequate medical care  
10 for jail detainees who, like Ms. Hill, have not been convicted of a crime. *Lolli v.*  
11 *County of Orange*, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003). A jail official violates  
12 that right when (1) she makes an intentional decision with respect to the detainee’s  
13 conditions of confinement; (2) those conditions put the detainee at substantial risk  
14 of suffering serious harm; (3) the jail official does not take reasonable available  
15 measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances  
16 would appreciate the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of the  
17 official’s conduct obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, the official causes  
18 injury to the detainee. *Gordon v. Cty. of Orange*, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir.  
19 2018). “With respect to the third element, the [jail official’s] conduct must be  
20

1 objectively unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and  
2 circumstances of each particular case.” *Id.* (citations omitted).

3 Ms. Hill was deprived of her constitutional right to adequate medical care  
4 when Nurse Gubitiz responded to her extreme and unexplained abdominal pain by  
5 transferring her to another unit of the jail—where she would receive no medical  
6 attention whatsoever for at least the next five hours—rather than sending her to a  
7 hospital ER or referring her to a higher-level medical provider. That decision put  
8 Ms. Hill at substantial risk of serious harm. Ex. V (Roscoe expert report) at 13-14  
9 (“By placing patients like Ms. Hill in a Medical Watch unit that provided no real  
10 health monitoring as their condition required, NaphCare and its staff were  
11 exposing their patients to a substantial risk of serious harm.”).

12 Nurse Gubitiz’ decision to leave Ms. Hill suffering in acute, severe pain—  
13 pain that caused her to scream upon the lightest touch and to curl into the fetal  
14 position—for several hours, rather than arranging for her to receive prompt  
15 attention from a medical provider capable of diagnosing and treating the cause of  
16 her pain, was objectively unreasonable. According to Dr. Emily Feely, NaphCare’s  
17 chief medical officer at the time of Ms. Hill’s death, it is not acceptable to leave a  
18 patient to suffer without doing anything to treat such pain. Ex. W (Dep. of Dr.  
19 Emily Feely) at 48:14 – 49:21. Nurse Gubitiz did not doubt that Ms. Hill was  
20 suffering severe abdominal pain in the morning of August 25, 2018. Ex. F (Dep. of



1 Hannah Gubitz) at 61:8-25. However, she did nothing to help alleviate it. Balson  
2 decl. ¶ 32. Instead, she left Ms. Hill to suffer in excruciating pain for the next  
3 several hours until she died. This alone constitutes deliberate indifference, even  
4 under the more demanding standard of the Eighth Amendment. *See Watson v.*  
5 *Wash. Dep't of Corr.*, No. C17-5968-BHS-TLF, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 220412, at  
6 \*11-12 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 2018) (“[W]e have long held that the Eighth  
7 Amendment forbids not only deprivations of medical care that produce physical  
8 torture and lingering death, but also less serious denials which cause or perpetuate  
9 pain.”) (quoting *Brock v. Wright*, 315 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2003)).

10 Nurse Gubitz knew that the kind of extreme abdominal pain with which Ms.  
11 Hill presented was symptomatic of multiple life-threatening conditions requiring  
12 urgent medical attention, none of which she was able to rule out. Ex. F at 20:5 –  
13 23:3, 66:19 – 68:3. Nonetheless, she decided not to refer Ms. Hill to higher-level  
14 care to diagnose and treat the cause of her pain. Instead, she transferred Ms. Hill to  
15 a “medical watch” unit, where she would receive no medical attention for several  
16 hours.

17 Nurse Gubitz’ actions violated NaphCare’s own written policy. At the time  
18 of Ms. Hill’s detention, NaphCare had a policy that required nurses to use “nursing  
19 assessment protocols” when providing clinical care. Ex. X. The protocols expressly  
20 required nurses to “NOTIFY [the] Provider and begin treatment” when a patient

1 with abdominal pain was in “acute distress.” Ex. Y at 3 (emphasis in original).  
2 Nurse Gubitz knew Ms. Hill was in acute distress. Ex. F at 166:5-13. Yet she failed  
3 to notify a provider or begin treatment, as required.

4 Lori Roscoe, Plaintiffs’ correctional nursing expert, explains how Nurse  
5 Gubitz acted unreasonably in her response to Ms. Hill’s severe pain:

6 The standard of nursing care required RN Gubitz to contact a provider  
7 about Ms. Hill’s condition when she was presented with being too  
8 sick to move; lying in a fetal position; screaming in pain generally and  
9 then screaming louder when RN Gubitz came close to do the  
10 abdominal palpation; screaming with light palpation of the abdomen  
11 and back; and pain in her right lower quadrant. When she failed to do  
12 so and instead placed Ms. Hill on Medical Watch on the morning of  
13 August 25th, the standard of care required that RN Gubitz complete a  
14 reassessment of her abdominal pain, to have occurred many hours  
15 prior to the attempted COWS monitoring that afternoon. Prudent  
16 nursing care for a patient screaming in severe right lower quadrant  
17 abdominal pain, who was lying in a fetal position on the floor and  
18 could not move because of the pain dictates that a reassessment is  
19 done within one to two hours to determine if the patient is improving,  
20 staying the same, or deteriorating. After the reassessment was  
completed, RN Gubitz should have contacted the provider to report  
Ms. Hill’s condition at that time. Although Ms. Hill was placed on  
Medical Watch, where purportedly she would be checked every thirty  
minutes, that did not substitute for the required nursing physical  
reassessment. The failure of RN Gubitz to return timely to Ms. Hill  
and conduct a reassessment of her pain and general condition  
significantly breached the standard of nursing care.

Ex. V at 11-12.

Plaintiffs’ physician experts will testify that Ms. Hill likely would have  
survived her abdominal peritonitis had she been sent to a hospital prior to the time

1 she lost consciousness in the late afternoon or early evening of August 25, 2018.  
2 Ex. M (Schubl report) at 7; Ex. Z (Barnett report) at 8. Nurse Gubitz' failure to  
3 obtain the urgent care Ms. Hill desperately needed caused her to experience  
4 extraordinary levels of pain and ultimately caused her death.

5 A jury could easily conclude that Nurse Gubitz violated Ms. Hill's  
6 Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care by placing her on "medical  
7 watch" rather than obtaining appropriate medical care for her. That decision  
8 exposed Ms. Hill to a substantial risk of serious harm, as it virtually guaranteed  
9 that she would not be seen by a single medical provider for several hours, that she  
10 would continue to suffer excruciating pain, and that responsibility for monitoring  
11 her medical condition would be passed to unqualified corrections officers who did  
12 no more than look in her cell periodically and note whether she was awake or  
13 asleep. Nurse Gubitz' failure to obtain necessary medical care for Ms. Hill was  
14 objectively unreasonable and caused her suffering and death.

15 **(b) Spokane County has a longstanding practice of relying on**  
16 **untrained corrections officers to monitor patients with acute**  
**medical needs.**

17 The second element of Plaintiffs' constitutional claim against Spokane  
18 County requires Plaintiffs to show that the County had a longstanding practice or  
19 custom. A practice or custom is "any permanent, widespread, well-settled practice  
20 or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure." *Castro v. Cty. of Los*

1 *Angeles*, 833 F.3d at 1074 (approving jury instruction). Here, it is undisputed that  
2 Spokane County has a longstanding, well-settled practice of relying on untrained  
3 jail guards to conduct “medical watch” for acutely ill patients.

4 Director Michael Sparber is the highest-ranking official in charge of the  
5 Spokane County Jail. Ex. I (Sparber dep.) at 6:17-22, 8:5-8. He confirmed in his  
6 deposition that the corrections officers responsible for conducting “medical watch”  
7 are not medically trained. *Id.* at 82:4-13. He explained:

8 Generally the watches are handled by—not generally. Most—  
9 probably always handled by the guards, and they’re the ones that go  
10 by and check the cells. They’re not medically trained, but they are  
11 trained to observe, and if they find, as in this case, that the individual  
12 wasn’t moving, then they respond and call for medical staff to  
13 respond.

14 *Id.* at 83:13-19. When asked “why a person on medical watch is being watched by  
15 nonmedically trained guards as opposed to a medically trained person,” Director  
16 Sparber responded as follows:

17 It’s been our—it’s been our policy. It’s been our practice. I know  
18 primarily it’s because the officers are required to do 30-minute rounds  
19 anyway, and it—the 2 West is—has been set up and created in a way  
20 that it allows better observation along the officer station, and then I’m  
sure that the nurse has got other DT protocols and other things that  
she’s attending to as well, but other than a nurse checking in on  
them—ideally that would be the best, if they were making the 30-  
minute rounds, but that hasn’t been our practice, so . . .

. . .

I think that it’s been our practice since I started in 1988.

1 *Id.* at 84:21 – 85:12.

2 In other words, even though Director Sparber acknowledges it would be  
3 better for patients on medical watch to be monitored by nurses, it has been the  
4 jail's practice for more than 30 years to have such patients monitored by  
5 corrections officers with no medical training. Based on Director Sparber's  
6 testimony, the existence of the County's longstanding practice for monitoring  
7 patients on medical watch can hardly be disputed.

8 **(c) Spokane County's medical watch practice reflects deliberate**  
9 **indifference to detainees' serious medical needs.**

10 The customs and practices of a local government entity evidence deliberate  
11 indifference "when the need for more or different action 'is so obvious, and the  
12 inadequacy [of the current procedure] is so likely to result in the violation of  
13 constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have been  
14 deliberately indifferent to the need.'" *Oviatt v. Pearce*, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477-78  
15 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989))  
16 (alterations in original). "Whether a local government entity has displayed a policy  
17 of deliberate indifference is generally a question for the jury." *Id.*

18 According to Nurse Gubitz, the medical watch cells on 2W are for patients  
19 who needed "acute medical monitoring." Ex. F at 170:5-6. However, the County's  
20 standard practice is to delegate responsibility for such monitoring to jail guards

1 who are not trained for the task. *See* Ex. H (Dep. of Spokane County Jail  
2 Lieutenant Don Hooper) at 16:23 – 17:16 (testifying that officers on 2W are not  
3 trained on how to medically monitor patients on medical watch or assess them for  
4 medical symptoms). The officers assigned to 2W are not required to have any  
5 special skills, qualifications, or experience, and the County does not provide them  
6 with any training beyond that provided to all officers generally. They are simply  
7 expected to look in the patient’s cell, confirm the patient is alive, and record what  
8 they see—e.g., whether the patient is awake or asleep, eating, etc. *See also* Ex. G  
9 (medical watch form for Cindy Hill, documenting nothing other than whether she  
10 was asleep or awake, that she refused lunch at one point, and that she was taken to  
11 the hospital at some unrecorded time).

12       The form Spokane County uses to document medical watches lists more than  
13 a dozen medical symptoms that officers are supposed to recognize and report to  
14 medical staff. *Id.* Yet the County never trained its officers on how to assess a  
15 patient for such symptoms. And in fact, despite the explicit instructions on the  
16 medical watch form, County officials did not actually expect their officers to assess  
17 patients for the presence of those symptoms. They were not trained to recognize  
18 signs of distress; County officials expected them to rely on their intuition. Lt.  
19 Hooper admits that a patient might experience one of the symptoms listed on the  
20 medical watch form, but if there are no obvious signs, the officer won’t necessarily

1 recognize it. A typical “medical check,” if the officer looked in the cell and did not  
2 see any immediate, obvious signs of distress, might last just two or three seconds.

3 Jail officials made no effort to coordinate medical watch procedures with  
4 NaphCare medical staff to ensure a common understanding of what the guards  
5 were supposed to do when performing medical watch. Consequently, Nurse  
6 Gubitz’ understanding of the medical watch procedure was significantly different  
7 than the reality. For example, she expected officers to observe Ms. Hill every 30  
8 minutes and ask her questions to assess whether she was experiencing worsening  
9 abdominal pain, nausea, or vomiting. Ex. F at 177:10 – 179:12. However, Lt.  
10 Hooper testified the officers were not trained on how to assess whether someone  
11 was experiencing pain, and if so, how severe it was. Ex. H at 40:20-23. Nurse  
12 Gubitz expected that a medical check would consist of something more than a  
13 quick glance to make sure the patient was awake, that it would last long enough for  
14 the officer to make contact and “have enough of a conversation to kind of quickly  
15 gauge better or worse, about the same.” Ex. F at 181:7-14. But according to  
16 Director Sparber, officers are not required to converse with patients on medical  
17 watch. They are simply required to “make sure that they see signs of life,” which  
18 could take just a few seconds. Ex. I at 57:13 – 58:4. Nurse Gubitz believed the  
19 officers charged with responsibility for medical watch would be able to distinguish  
20 between a patient who was sleeping from a person who was unconscious. Ex. F at

1 181:18-23. However, multiple officers responsible for medical watch on the day of  
2 Ms. Hill's death confirmed that was not the case.

3         Spokane County's "medical watch" practice consisted of little more than  
4 untrained jail guards peering into the cells of acutely ill patients for a few seconds,  
5 checking for signs of life, and quickly recording superficial observations, such as  
6 whether the patient appeared to be awake or asleep. Plaintiffs' corrections expert,  
7 Robert Ayers, reviewed the practice and concluded that it exposed inmates with  
8 acute medical needs to a substantial risk of harm:

9         The [jail's] medical watch practice amounted to nothing more than the  
10 correctional officers on 2W doing their normal jobs. They were  
11 already required to do rounds every 30 minutes. The reality of those  
12 30-minute checks is to make sure the inmate is where they are  
13 supposed to be and alive. Unless something is glaringly obvious, such  
14 as bleeding or unusual behavior, there is little likelihood a medical  
15 problem would be noticed during those routine 30-minute checks. This informal medical watch practice depended on clinically untrained  
16 correctional officers to recognize and report symptom changes  
17 without any written authorization or direction. . . . With more than 50  
18 years of experience in the field of corrections it is my opinion that  
19 such an informal practice is haphazard and guaranteed to fail, putting  
20 inmates and detainees at substantial risk of suffering serious harm.

16 Ex. BB at 16-17.

17         Mr. Ayers further asserts that "[t]he risks posed by the County's medical  
18 watch practices should have been obvious to the jail's administrators and  
19 policymakers." *Id.* at 17. He wrote as follows in his report:



1 I find it astonishing that over the course of 30 years a modern county  
2 jail in a metropolitan area hadn't come to the realization that a  
3 medical watch at least implies a medical process and that having  
4 clinically untrained staff make symptom assessments (particularly  
5 with no training or standards) is improper from a correctional  
standpoint. . . . It is inconceivable that [Director Sparber] did not  
understand the danger posed by having untrained staff perform an  
informal medical practice with poorly crafted policy and no  
procedure.

6 *Id.*

7 Based on the foregoing, a reasonable jury could easily conclude that the  
8 inadequacy of the County's medical watch practice was so obvious, and so likely  
9 to result in serious harm to acutely ill patients, that it reflected deliberate  
10 indifference to detainees' constitutional right to adequate medical care. *See, e.g.,*  
11 *Sabbie v. Southwestern Corr., LLC*, No. 5:17cv113-RWS-CMC, 2019 U.S. Dist.  
12 LEXIS 214463, at \*181-82, 189 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2019) (recommending denial  
13 of summary judgment for jail operator where "inmates who needed medical  
14 monitoring were placed in medical observation cells [in which] they would be  
15 monitored, not by medical personnel with medical training, but by jail security  
16 guards with no medical training" and where the jail operator "failed to give its  
17 security staff guidance on how to monitor inmates with serious medical needs").

18 **(d) The County's medical watch practice was the moving force**  
19 **behind Ms. Hill's death.**

20 To satisfy the final element of this claim, Plaintiffs need only show that the

1 County's practice was the "moving force" behind Cindy Hill's suffering and death.  
2 *See Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe*, 290 F.3d 1175, 1196 (9th Cir. 2002). In other words,  
3 Plaintiffs must simply show that the deficient practice was "closely related to the  
4 ultimate injury." *Id.* (quoting *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989)).

5 As a direct result of the County's practice of having medically untrained jail  
6 guards monitor acutely ill patients, Ms. Hill was confined alone in a so-called  
7 "medical watch" cell, left to suffer with virtually no medical attention for more  
8 than eight hours. During most of that time, there is no evidence that anybody asked  
9 her about her symptoms, attempted to engage her in conversation, checked her  
10 vitals, or did anything more than briefly glance into her cell and record whether she  
11 appeared to be asleep or awake.<sup>2</sup> According to Plaintiffs' expert Dr. Sebastian  
12 Schubl, "The lack of evaluation between 8:45am and 3 pm, assuming that she was  
13 even actually evaluated at 3 pm on 8/25, is far too long of an interval for someone  
14 with a concerning new finding such as [Ms. Hill] developed, and this neglect

15 \_\_\_\_\_  
16 <sup>2</sup> The only possible interaction Ms. Hill had with a medical professional during her  
17 eight hours on medical watch was the alleged encounter with Nurse Gubitza at  
18 approximately 3:00 p.m., roughly two-and-a-half hours before a guard discovered  
19 her unconscious in her cell. Although Nurse Gubitza claimed that Ms. Hill sat up  
20 during that encounter, engaged in calm conversation, declined to be assessed, and  
appeared in no acute or immediate distress, Plaintiffs' physician expert asserts  
Nurse Gubitza's description is "medically impossible."

1 compounded the error of not having her seen by a higher-level provider in the  
2 morning.” Ex. M at 6.

3 Nurse Gubitz properly recognized that Ms. Hill was in acute distress and  
4 extreme pain when she saw her in the morning of August 25, 2018. But for the  
5 County’s “medical watch” procedure, Nurse Gubitz would have had to respond to  
6 Ms. Hill’s condition that morning by (1) sending her to the ER, (2) referring the  
7 case to a higher-level provider, or (3) ordering that she be monitored by a nurse or  
8 other medical professional. Had she done any of those things, Ms. Hill likely  
9 would have been transferred to an ER. *See* Ex. Z (Barnett report) at 7 (“If a  
10 medical provider had been consulted by Nurse Gubitz with the information she  
11 documented in the medical record after her 8:45am assessment on 8/25/18, it is  
12 more likely than not that she would have been instructed to transfer Ms. Hill to the  
13 Emergency Department for further evaluation.”). Indeed, Dr. Jeffrey Maple,  
14 NaphCare’s medical director at the Spokane County Jail at the time, testified that if  
15 Nurse Gubitz had contacted him on August 25 and reported the information she  
16 had documented in Ms. Hill’s medical chart that morning, he likely would have  
17 recommended that Ms. Hill be taken to the ER. Ex. AA at 69:3 – 70:6. Had Ms.  
18 Hill been sent to the ER at any point prior to her losing consciousness late that  
19 afternoon, she likely would have survived. Ex. Z at 8; Ex. M at 7.

1       Following Ms. Hill’s death, Spokane County retained Dr. Steven Hammond,  
2 former chief medical officer for the Washington Department of Corrections, to  
3 review the circumstances leading to her death. Ex. I (Sparber dep.) at 27:11-17,  
4 29:24 – 30:2. Among his other conclusions, Dr. Hammond wrote, “In retrospect,  
5 more thorough medical evaluation and closer clinical monitoring might have  
6 resulted in earlier transfer to the hospital, before she had a cardiac arrest, which  
7 could have changed the outcome in this case.” Ex. CC at 6.

8       In sum, Spokane County had a longstanding practice of relying on guards  
9 with no medical training to clinically monitor seriously ill detainees. This practice  
10 put such detainees at substantial risk of serious harm, reflected deliberate  
11 indifference to the constitutional rights of those in the County’s custody, and led  
12 directly to Ms. Hill’s death. For these reasons, the Court should deny summary  
13 judgment on Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim against the County.

14       **2. The County negligently caused Ms. Hill’s death by making non-**  
15 **medically trained jail guards responsible for monitoring her when**  
**she was suffering from an acute and serious illness.**

16       Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against Defendant Spokane County is premised  
17 on the same facts that support their constitutional claim—i.e., that the County’s  
18 practice of having non-medically trained corrections officers provide medical  
19 monitoring to inmates with serious medical needs breached the duty it owed to  
20 those in its custody and caused Ms. Hill’s death.

1 “The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a duty to  
2 the plaintiff, breach of the duty, and injury to plaintiff proximately caused by the  
3 breach.” *Hertog v. City of Seattle*, 138 Wn.2d 265, 275, 979 P.2d 400, 406 (1999)  
4 (citation omitted). “Breach and proximate cause are generally fact questions for the  
5 trier of fact.” *Id.*

6 As noted above, Spokane County had a duty under state law to provide Ms.  
7 Hill with adequate medical care. *Shea v. Spokane*, 17 Wn. App. at 242. (“When a  
8 city takes custody of a prisoner, it must provide health care for that prisoner. This  
9 is a positive duty arising out of the special relationship that results when a  
10 custodian has complete control over a prisoner deprived of liberty.”) (citation  
11 omitted). A reasonable jury could find that the County breached that duty when it  
12 assigned officers with no medical training to monitor Ms. Hill when she was in  
13 acute distress and suffering from extreme, unexplained abdominal pain. Plaintiffs’  
14 corrections expert Robert Ayers describes the County’s breach as follows:

15 The informal medical watch practice at SCJ blurred the functional  
16 lines between health care staff and custody staff and virtually assured  
17 failure to provide health care meeting the industry standards in  
18 correctional settings. Based on my long association with health care  
19 professionals and my experience in developing corrective action plans  
20 for correctional health care judicial findings, I can find nothing in this  
medical watch practice that meets the standards of care in a modern  
detention environment.

Ex. BB at 16. Mr. Ayers further opines that the County’s practice, which

1 relied on clinically untrained correctional officers to recognize and report  
2 symptom changes, was “haphazard and guaranteed to fail, putting inmates  
3 and detainees at substantial risk of suffering serious harm.” *Id.* at 16-17.

4 Reasonable jurors, viewing all facts and drawing all inferences in Plaintiffs’  
5 favor, could easily conclude that Spokane County breached its duty to provide Ms.  
6 Hill with adequate medical care, proximately causing her death. Therefore, the  
7 Court should deny summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim.

8 **C. Spokane County is liable for the negligent and unconstitutional**  
9 **practices of NaphCare and Nurse Gubitza.**

10 Although the County is free to contract with a third party to provide medical  
11 services to those detained in its jail, doing so does not relieve it of its constitutional  
12 duty to provide detainees with adequate medical care. *Lemmons v. Cty. of Sonoma*,  
13 No. 16-cv-04553-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7526, at \*8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17,  
14 2018) (citing *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 55 (1988)). The County’s constitutional  
15 duty is non-delegable, and it remains liable for any constitutional deprivations  
16 caused by NaphCare’s policies, customs, or practices. *Id.* at \*8-9 (“By ceding  
17 control and final decision making to [a private contractor] as it relates to providing  
18 adequate healthcare to its prisoners, [the contractor’s] policies effectively become  
19 the policies of [the] County. If [the contractor’s] policies or customs resulted in  
20

1 unconstitutionally inadequate treatment, [the] County could be held liable given  
2 their non-delegable duty to comply with the Constitution.”).

3 The same basic principle applies to the County’s duty under state law. *See*  
4 *Shea v. Spokane*, 17 Wn. App. at 242 (“It is apparent that the City’s duty must go  
5 beyond the mere exercise of ordinary care in the selection of a jail physician . . . .  
6 Rather, the City’s liability includes the negligence of the jail physician because the  
7 duty to keep the prisoner in health is nondelegable.”), *aff’d*, 90 Wn.2d 43 (1978).

8 Spokane County wholly ignored Plaintiffs’ claims based on the non-  
9 delegable duty doctrine. It did not address the alleged negligence and constitutional  
10 violations by Nurse Gubitz and NaphCare—let alone establish a lack of factual  
11 issues pertaining to those allegations. And it failed to demonstrate it is entitled to  
12 judgment on those claims as a matter of law. Accordingly, the County has not  
13 satisfied its summary judgment burden regarding those claims and the Court  
14 should deny its motion.

#### 15 IV. CONCLUSION

16 Reasonable jurors viewing the facts in Plaintiffs’ favor could easily find that  
17 Spokane County’s longstanding “medical watch” practice subjects jail detainees  
18 with acute medical needs to a substantial risk of serious harm and that it was the  
19 moving force behind Cindy Hill’s suffering and death. The County has failed to  
20 demonstrate it is entitled to summary judgment. The Court should deny its motion.

1  
2 Respectfully submitted this 4th day of February, 2022.  
3

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned certifies that on the date stated below this document was filed with the Clerk of the Court for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, via the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following e-mail addresses:

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